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The Distinctiveness of Trial Narrative
Robert P. Burns

Abstract

Scholars have drawn on the rich literature on narrative in their research into the
American trial, a perspective at least implicitly endorsed by the United States
Supreme Court in the Old Chief case. This is all to the good. However, the real
power of the “narrative approach” emerges when one thinks concretely about what
is distinctive to the different kinds of narrative employed at trial. This article explores the rhetorical and epistemological significance of trial narrative in the full
context of the ”consciously structured hybrid” of language practices that make up
the American trial. Such a perspective enables us to admire a well-tried case as
realizing practical truths beyond story-telling.

The Distinctiveness of Trial Narrative
ROBERT P. BURNS

Introduction: Description, Interpretation, and Evaluation
Wittgenstein’s injunction to “Don’t think, look!” gives us the first step to an adequate
understanding of the trial, but only the first. As I have recently argued at length, 1 much
more is afoot in the trial than our received philosophies of law would suggest. Indeed, an
adequate understanding of the trial, “the central institution of law as we know it,”2
cannot but enrich our understanding of “what law is.” I believe that the common law trial
is one of our great cultural achievements, but that we need first to describe, then interpret,
and finally “think what we do,” as Hannah Arendt liked to put it, in order to fully
appreciate it. Finally, the most adequate interpretation of the account of the “consciously
structured hybrid of languages” that make up the trial will have an idealizing quality. It
will be “partly evaluative, since it consists in the identification of the principles which
both best ‘fit’ or cohere with the settled law and practices of a legal system and also
provide the best moral justification for them, thus showing the law ‘in its best light.’”

3

These principles will turn out to be situated ideals, ideals already implicit in the practices
that constitute the trial. And so the best account can be justified only in the same way
that the best judgment can be achieved at trial, hermeneutically, “by the mutual support
1

R. Burns, A Theory of the Trial (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1999).

2

J.White, From Expectation to Experience: Essays on Law and Legal Education (Ann Arbor, University of

Michigan Press, 1999), 108.
3

H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 2nd ed. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994), 239-41, quoting R.

Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge, Belknap Press, 1986), 90.
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of many considerations of everything fitting together into one coherent whole.”4 The
method for an adequate interpretation of the trial must involve “a continuous dialectical
tacking between the most local of local detail and the most global of global structures in
such a way as to bring both into view simultaneously.”5 Such an account is reflexive, an
interpretation of an interpretation. The criteria for the adequacy of both interpretations
are the same, and both interpretations have an idealizing element. Primarily insofar as
actual trials fall away from that ideal, is there call for explanation, rather than
interpretation, for efficient causes or correlations, rather than final or formal causes.
And, though I will say almost nothing about this here, the best way to understand those
deviations from the ideal is by examining the formal and often bureaucratic framework
within which practices of the trial go forward, to understand how practices can be
distorted by the institutions within which they are encased. But this, too, is a delicate
business, because the formal rules of the trial—the rules of discovery, evidence,
professional responsibility, and procedure—are enabling as well as distorting. And the
discriminations here have to be as careful and context-specific as are the discriminations
made at trial.

I have spoken of the common law trial. There is no doubt that my own
experience of the common law trial is in its American incarnation. My knowledge of the
English and Scottish versions is through reading and conversation. There are significant
4

J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1971) 579.

5

C. Geertz, ‘From the Native’s Point of View: On the Nature of Anthropological Understanding,” in P.

Rabinow and W. Sullivan (eds.), Interpretive Social Science: A Reader (Berkeley and Los Angeles,
University of California Press, 1979), 239.
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differences in trial practices within the common law tradition, though they are relatively
less significant that the differences between common law trials and “inquisitorial”
procedures. Although the trial is an important institution in all common law countries,
one may argue about whether the history and subsequent “spirit of the laws” of one or
other country makes the trial more or less central. One can also imagine a continuum with
the American trial at one extreme, British trial procedure near it, and continental versions
farther along. Though the greater availability of the jury, especially in civil cases, in
America is a feature of these differences, it is not itself the focus of my argument. I focus
on the trial’s linguistic practices and the constitutive rules that surround them. Though I
am wary asking what is “essential” to the common law trial, let me mention some
important features. Common law trials involve a relatively greater control by the parties
over what evidence is presented and perhaps more importantly, how it is presented, and
thus, implicitly, greater control over the range of social norms and common sense
judgments which the party may invoke. Common law trials create a tension between the
parties’ “theories of the case,” narratives designed to embody powerful social norms,
including those not explicitly appearing in the law as written, and the almost obsessively
detailed presentation of evidence of events in question. In the American version, this
“theory of the case” is explicitly presented in opening statement, but it is also present
implicitly, as I understand it, even in the Scottish version (which does not employ
opening statement) where it appears incrementally in the parties witness examinations,
both direct and cross, and then explicitly in summation. Though the “law of rules” is
important to the structure of the common law trial in a number of ways, it does not
provide the only social norms at play in the trial.

3
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Depending on one’s perspective, one can describe the whole range of common
law trials as more individualist, more political, more democratic, more empiricist, more
egalitarian, more dramatic or theatrical, and more adversarial than their continental
cousins. Likewise they can be described as less authoritarian, less statist, less rationalist,
less normatively coherent, and less professional. Which form of trial is better? In a
recent exchange with Lindsay Farmer, 6 I argued that one can begin to compare the
relative strengths of trials only in relation to the societies in which they have their places.
The “right” trial for a more traditional, hierarchical, and organic society will be different
from the “right” trial for a more market-based, egalitarian, and individualist society.
With the exception of features of the trial that are responsive to fully universal norms, 7
judgments about relative superiority of this or that procedural feature can only be
evaluated in the context of all the procedural features of the trial and from within a
particular political tradition. It is only because procedure X in tradition A solves a
problem in tradition B that its own procedure Y cannot solve that one may say that
procedure X is superior to Y for B. 8

6

L. Farmer, ‘Whose Trial? Comments on A Theory of the Trial,’ 28 Law and Social Inquiry 547 (2003); R.

Burns, ‘A Response to Four Readings of A Theory of the Trial’ 28 Law and Social Inquiry 553 (2003).
7

Whether there are such and what they are is, of course, an enormous inquiry that I avoid here for reasons

of space.
8

See A. MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame

Press, 1988) , 349-69.
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One final, related, and perhaps controversial point. The most adequate account of
the trial will require a “style of ‘attentiveness to reality’ that is more the mark of the
political actor than a scholar” because political understanding relates more closely to
political action than to political science…”9 The most adequate knowledge of the trial is
that which an experienced participant—say a trial lawyer or a judge—has in his or her
reflective moments. It involves “finding a footing” (Heidegger) or “finding one’s way
around” (Wittgenstein). This is what occurs at trial, I will argue. If an account of the
trial is successful, it is what begins to occur in the reader of that account.

An Interpretation of the Common Law Trial
Let me state rather baldly a set of conclusions that seem to me to constitute the core of
the best interpretation of the common law trial. I will devote most of my efforts here to
describing the place of the narrative structure of the trial within this interpretation.
Though the received view expresses only a partial truth, the languages and performances
of the trial are highly structured. This structure, about which more shortly, is what
imposes the discipline on the largely tacit response to an engrossing situation that
determines the jury verdict. The more engrossing that structure—and a well- tried case
can be enormously engrossing—the better will be the judgment the jury renders. The
judgment is better because the jury has “dwelled” within the tensions created by that
structure. The effect of the trial’s hybrid of languages is to create an almost unbearable
tension of opposites. Some of those tensions are among roles (judge, lawyer, witness,
jury), but many are among forms of language. Those tensions reflect the tensions among
the conflicting forms of life, norms, and mode of social ordering that exist within the
9

D. Luban, Legal Modernism (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1994), 206.
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society as a whole. It is within those tensions, created in part by the constitutive rules of
the trial, that the jury can get it right, can decide what is the most important aspect of the
case in front of them, not in general, but in the context of a level of knowledge about a
concrete situation that they will almost never have in ordinary experience. This
experience allows the trial to function as a kind of critique of both common sense and of
the law. The jury’s final form of understanding is a literally indescribable 10 grasp of
facts, norms, and possibilities for action. Its implicit mode of social ordering is not
formalistic and is anti-bureaucratic and so the trial is an important bulwark for us against
the often bureaucratic “onslaught of modernity.”11 What the common law trial allows is

10

This phrase occasioned quite a bit of consternation and discussion at the Sterling Conference. This was

understandable in that I have gone on for hundreds of pages about trial decision-making. What is
“indescribable,” I think, is the subjective “grasp” (note the physicalist metaphor) in the individual case of
the right way to go forward. One can identify all the elements of the rules and practices of the trial, what I
call the objective side of the trial event, to which the jury responds. One can identify the cognitive
operations of which the jury would have to be capable in order to get it right. One can give increasingly
adequate philosophical accounts of those operations. In an individual case, one can provide reasons
defending the chosen resolution of the factual and normative issues. But this subjective grasp seems to
require an integration of incommensurable factual, legal, moral, and political considerations unique to the
case, “too fine to avail separately, too circuitous to be convertible into syllogisms.” If the trier of fact can
“get it right,” it will not be because the result necessarily or deductively flows from any inevitably general
descriptions of features of the case. The philosophical tradition contains many attempts to explain the
“practical holism” that this account suggests. Those attempts are themselves inevitably hermeneutical in
that they rely on “the mutual support of many considerations, of everything filling together into one
coherent view” that does not compel assent. See R. Burns, A Theory of the Trial, 4-5, 201-219. See also P.
Steinberger, The Concept of Political Judgment (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993).
11

H. Arendt, On Revolution (New York, Viking, 1965), 196.
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a practical judgment of the relative importance of the moral, political, and formal legal
aspects of the case, again, not generally, but in the very specific context of the facts of the
individual case. One of the tensions within which the mind of the jury dwells is the
tension between formal legality—“closeness of fit” with the legal rules—and the other
dimensions of the case. The importance of that tension is, more narrowly, that it keeps
the law from ossifying into a rigid ballet of bloodless categories. More broadly, it allows
us moderns to renew our society after the passing away of any Archimedian point from
which the entire society may be criticized at once--whether Absolute Knowledge, a
politically dispositive Categorical Imperative or Divine Revelation, or a “scientific”
understanding of the interests of the Universal Class. Instead, the common law trial is
one of the places we moderns can do what we need to do, “less to create constantly new
forms of life than to creatively renew actual forms by taking advantage of their internal
multiplicity and tensions with one another.”12

These are enormous claims, and I will not be able to provide all the evidence for
all of them here. What I will do, however, is to show how the narrative structure of the
trial is of a piece with the interpretation of the trial I have offered. The general structure
of the trial is familiar. The common law trial begins not with the evidence, but with
opening statement. Here the lawyers are permitted to tell the jury what the evidence will
show, not merely provide a preview of what the actual evidence will be. Significantly, he
may narrate, but he may not argue. The party with the burden of proof then will present

12

D. Kolb, The Critique of Pure Modernity: Hegel, Heidegger and After (Chicago, University of Chicago

Press, 1986.
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his evidence, mainly in the form of a series of direct examinations of his witnesses. The
direct examinations will require the witness to answer nonleading questions and testify
“in the language of perception,” that is, in the main, recount what he did and what he
saw. They will typically be structured in the form of description followed by
chronological narration and will force the mind of the jury down to the details of the
events recounted. Witnesses will be limited to the “representative” function of language:
they will typically not be permitted to make promises (not to do it again), give advice
(how to rule in the case), or provide overt interpretations of the behavior they recount
(what was on the perpetrator’s mind when he acted.) Each witness will be subject to
cross examination, which will interrupt the flow of direct examinations and force the jury
to see the evidence from a contrary point of view. When the party with the burden of
proof rests, then the opposing party will present its evidence, itself interrupted by cross
examination. The party with the burden of proof may offer rebuttal testimony. The
parties will offer closing argument, the jury instructions will be read, and the case will be
submitted to the jury.

The Orthodox Interpretation: The Received View of the Trial
Let me present first the outlines of what I take to be an orthodox understanding of the
trial, what I call the “received view of the trial.” Within this view, which I take not so
much to be wrong as to be woefully partial, the trial is the institutional device for
realizing the rule of law where there are disputes of fact. The goal of trial procedure,

8
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including the law of evidence, is to allow the jury13 to engage in a three-step process: (1)
to construct an accurate, value- free account of what occurred, (2)to engage in an act of
what might be called “fair categorization,” by which it determines whether the value free
account previously constructed fairly fits within the categories defined by the substantive
law and found concretely in the jury instructions, and finally (3)announce a verdict that
emerges solely from the inspection of the conclusions reached at stage (2) to determine
whether the party with the burden of proof has established by the legally defined standard
(“preponderance of the evidence” or “clear and convincing evidence” or “beyond a
reasonable doubt”) each of the elements of the crime, claim, or affirmative defense. In
this view, the construction of a value- free and accurate account of what happened is the
result of common-sense reasoning, common sense being conceived as a “web of belief”
containing value- free empirical generalizations about probabilities connecting bits of
circumstantial evidence to “material” factual conclusions. It is important that this
account be value-free so that the only source of norms to enter the trial flow from the law
embedded in the jury instructions, itself legitimized somewhat differently in natural law
and positivist traditions. The rule of law should be the law of rules. 14 Put less charitably,
it is a form of “mechanical jurisprudence” at the trial level.

The received view has power. It explains a good deal of what actually goes on in
common law trials, their most distinctive features. In particular, it explains the central

13

For ease of reference, I will refer to “the trier of fact” as the “jury.” The social scientific literature

suggests that judges and juries reach the same conclusions in the significant majority of cases. Not much
turns on the distinction for purposes of the account I provide.
14

A. Scalia, ‘The Rule of Law as Law of Rules,’ 56 U.CHI.L.REV. 1175 (1989)
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evidentiary doctrine of “materiality,” a doctrine that requires that each bit of evidence
have a pedigree, or “warrant,” that connects it up though an empirical generalization
found usually in common sense, though sometimes in science, with a fact that is “of
consequence,” that is, which the substantive law declares to be of significance. It also in
part explains the pervasive preference of the common law of evidence for testimony in
the language of perception by witnesses who themselves have had perceptual experience
of the matter to which they would testify. The received view is also connected with
important political ideals, specifically with justice as regularity, the notion that legal
decisions should be based on rules announced ahead of time and that similar cases be
similarly decided. The former fosters autonomy of the citizen in that it allows him to
avoid the state’s intrusion into his freely planned affairs by his staying clear of the lines
drawn by the pre-announced rules. The latter assumes tha t there are constant and legally
salient aspects of inevitably different situations whose presence or absence can be made
the criterion for decision in different cases.

It is also connected up with notions supporting the normative superiority of the
substantive law to the contextual moral intuition that would likely prevail in the absence
of legal doctrine. In natural law traditions, such as that represented by Blackstone, the
slow development of common law rules provides a deeper appreciation of the demands of
right reason in particular contexts than could ever be expected from the immediate
intuitions of a particular judge or jury. In positivist traditions, this normative superiority
usually is derived from the source of law in the statutes passed by democratically elected

10
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bodies and so expresses the will of the people. (Of course, there are many varieties of
each tradition and the lines between them can be blurred.)

I have argued that this model of trial decision making fails to take account of a
large range of the practices in which we are actually engaged, and that those practices,
and even the legal rules that structure them, reflect a different ideal of trial decisionmaking. This is largely a descriptive matter and I have argued at length that the received
view does not fairly capture central aspects of what our actual practices are. Description,
however, cannot here be wholly separated from evaluation. It is always open to a
defender of the received view to argue that all the aspects of trial practices that are
inconsistent with the received view are simply appropriate targets for reform. But this is
simply to emphasize the point made earlier about the inevitably hermeneutical or circular
nature of justification in this context. Each theorist must argue that the descriptive details
he emphasizes are, as Rawls puts it, “considered judgments” of justice, and so deserving
of normative weight in the process of achieving reflective equilibrium on these matters,
and also that they are consistent with broader political ideals which we accept and which
we can defend. In other words, justification comes “by the mutual support of many
considerations of everything fitting together into one coherent whole” that requires “a
continuous dialectical tacking between the most local of local detail and the most global
of global structures in such a way as to bring both into view simultaneously.”

During and after the Sterling Conference, philosopher Sandra Marshall raised a
series of questions concerning the status of the received view and my view that it

11
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expresses a “partial” view of the trial. The orthodox view is partial in a number of ways.
It captures some trials more than others. I argued in A Theory of the Trial that common
law trials are ultimately about what dimension of the situation is most important. Thus in
some cases, cases which relatively little moral or political importance, the jury may well
decide that “fairness of fit” with the legal categories is the most important question that
the case presents and will decide the case must like the received view would expect. The
received view is also an important aspect of all contemporary common law trials, even in
American jury trials, because, I argue, the political values implicit in the “rule of law as
the law of rules” are important for our mode of self- governance, though not the only
values of importance. And so, for us, the received view does not present a unitary or
dominant ideal to which we ought to aspire; it does not offer an appropriate form of
adjudication for us. Are the features identified by the received view necessary, if not
sufficient, conditions of a proceeding to be a “trial.” For me, this is not a conceptual
question, but a normative one. We meaningfully use phrases like, “tria l by combat” and
“trial by ordeal.” At the other extreme, there exist in some places what are, by common
law standards, extremely unstructured forms of dispute resolution. I am not sure what we
are asking when we ask whether such procedures are “really trials.” For us, the fluid
tension among formal- legal, moral, and political modes of decision making that the
common law trial expresses, I have argued, is a “considered judgment” of justice, to use
Rawlsian language, a structure that reflects judgments made over a long period of time
under favorable conditions by those in a position to know what they are doing.
Justification of this mode of decision making has both descriptive and normative
elements. The task of understanding the trial is an interpretive task and it “is partly

12
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evaluative, since it consists in the identification of the principles which both best ‘fit’ or
cohere with the settled law and legal practices of a legal system and also provide the best
moral justification for them, thus showing the law ‘in its best light.’”15 So yes, for us, the
best form of trial is one where the values that the received view of the trial celebrates are
represented, but are in a harsh and demanding tension with other important values.

The Rhetorical Dimension of the Trial
My focus here will be on the narrative structure of the trial, how it proceeds by the
construction and deconstruction of narrative, of different sorts of narratives. That is itself
a partial perspective. To appreciate the trial fully, it is also necessary to appreciate a
range of other characteristics that are so basic that their significance can easily be missed.
The trial is spoken; it proceeds through time; it is a sort of drama; it is a rhetorical
situation. Each of these features has significance. 16 “The aspects of things that are most
important for us are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity.…[W]e fail to be
struck by what, once seen, is most striking and most powerful.”17 Because it is a partial
antidote to the received view, I want now to give a very compressed account of the ways
in which the trial is a rhetorical event. 18

15

H.L.A.Hart , The Concept of Law (2d ed.) (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1994) 239-41 (postscript to the

2d edition)(emphasis added) (describing Dworkin’s jurisprudential method).
16

Burns, supra n.1, 124-54.

17

L.Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe (New York, Macmillian Co.,

1953), 50.
18

For a fuller account, see R. Burns, ‘Law and Rhetoric’ in W. Jost & W. Olmstead eds., A Companion to

Rhetoric and Rhetorical Criticism (Oxford, Blackwell Publishers, 2003) [forthcoming].
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In a rhetorical situation, someone says something to somebody. Persuasiveness to
an audience is the primary criterion for judging the performance. Rhetoric rules where a
practical resolution of a concrete situation is necessary. In such a practical context, the
jury’s common sense is inevitably a source of norms, not simply a depository of
empirical generalizations. Rhetoric is in play where action is necessary under
uncertainty, and persuasion must occur through the “cumulative force of minute
considerations,” rather than by any direct comparison between what is said and the thing
itself. Such a comparison is impossible. As Gadamer put it with regard to artistic works,
“works of art are not reproductions of a reality that can be identified independently of the
work of art and used to judge the adequacy of its representation; rather the features of the
objects works of art represent…are illuminated only by means of the representation itself;
…Hence the representation does not provide a mirror of reality that exactly reflects
it….”19 The whole and the parts are mutually determining and the entire position is likely
accepted or rejected at once. This only suggests what we will see later—that
understanding the trial’s linguistic practices is the key to understanding the kind of truth
that is allowed to emerge within them. Rhetoricians’ “commonplaces”—multiple sources
for arguments—have always understood the multiplicity of the sources of “persuasives.”
We don’t only “use” rhetoric to achieve goals instrumentally, our norms and so our
identity are constituted rhetorically, in disputing the relative importance of multiple
norms for a highly specific situation—that is how we decide “who we are.” Negatively,
this suggests the limitations of the received view, especially when one considers, for
example, an engrossing two-week trial, followed by the reading for twenty minutes of
19

G. Warnke, Gadamer: Hermeneutics, Tradition and Reason (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1987),

58.

14
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art8

(often unintelligible) jury instructions. Decision in rhetorical situations stems from a
tacit response to a situation in which one is engrossed. This engrossing rhetorical
situation is the trial itself, a “consciously structured hybrid of languages” which
determines the kind of truth that can emerge under uncertainty for a practical purpose.

Now, to the ears of a certain sort of analytic philosopher, the “rhetorical” nature
of the trial may suggest the conclusion that the mode of thought at work at trial is
irrational, or worse. After all, doesn’t rhetoric have “savage roots,” doesn’t it inhabit the
“world of the lie,” isn’t it “a weapon called upon to gain victory in battles where the
decision hung on the spoken word,” isn’t it always “possible for the art of ‘saying it well’
to lay aside all concern for ‘speaking the truth’”? 20 At the very least, doesn’t the
rhetorical dimension of the trial suggest that decisions made there are “emotional” or
based on “sentiment.” Though I cannot make the argument here at length, the constitutive
rules of the trial, the rules of court procedure, evidence, and professional responsibility,
seek to maintain the energy that comes from rhetoric’s primitive roots (and so protect us
from the dead weight of bureaucratic lethargy) while structuring that energy to a
productive tension of opposites. I will say more about that it a moment. For now, the
rhetorical nature of the trial should make us suspect that the received view of the trial
cannot quite be true, that there is more in play than accurate fact- finding followed by fair
categorization. In fact, rhetoric does call forth a larger range of human responses than the

20

P.Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor: Multidisciplinary Studies of the Creation of Meaning in Language,

trans. Robert Czerny (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1975), 10-11.
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received view’s notion of judgment suggests. 21 My view is that this broader range of
responses allows the juror to capture more of the human truth of the situation before him:
Emotions can sometimes mislead and distort judgment; Aristotle is
aware of this. But they can also…give us access to a truer and deeper
level of ourselves, to values and commitments that have been concealed
by defensive ambition or rationalization.
But even this is, so far, too Platonic a line to take: for it suggests that
emotion is valuable only as an instrumental means to a purely intellectual
state. We know, however, that for Aristotle appropriate responses…can,
like good intellectual responses, help to constitute the refined “perception”
which is the best sort of human judgment. 22
The perception that is created by the trial’s “consciously structured hybrid of languages”
relies23 not only on feeling, but on what one theorist has called political wisdom:
Taken as a whole, this composite type of knowledge represents a
contrast with the scientific type. Its mode of activity is not so much the
style of the search as of reflection. It is mindful of logic, but more so of
the incoherence and contradictoriness of experience. And for the same
reason, it is distrustful of rigor. Political life does not yield its significance
to terse hypotheses but is elusive, and hence meaningful statements about
it often have to be allusive and imitative. Context becomes supremely
important, for actions and events occur in no other setting. Knowledge of
this type tends, therefore, to be suggestive and illuminative rather than
explicit and determine. 24

21

The received view operates on what Peter Steinberger has called the “tripartite model of judgment, a

process of categorization of particulars within universals. The Concept of Political Judgment (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1993). Steinberger argues that this is an impoverished account of the range of
performances embedded in quite ordinary human judgment.
22

M. Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy

(Cambrdige, Cambridge University Press, 1986), 390.
23

24

More precisely, the trial’s languages not only rely on these capacities, but, in a strong sense, realize them.
S. Wolin, ‘Political Theory as a Vocation,” in Machiavelli and the Nature of Political Thought, ed. M.

Fleischer (New York, Atheneum, 1972), 44-45.
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The Centrality of Narrative at Trial: A Preliminary Summary
We will see shortly that the kind of narrative that is available in opening statement is
quite different from the kinds of narrative that pervade the evidentiary phase of the trial.
But first, I want to consider briefly the significance of narrative in general as it operates
at trial As my title suggests, this is the least interesting aspect of the narrative quality of
the trial, and so easy deductions from the conclusions of the burgeoning field of
“narratology” to the nature of the trial are thus far misplaced. The full sequence of
considerations goes about like this. First we should consider the narrative quality of the
trial in general. Then we should consider the significance of the fact that the jury faces
almost immediately two competing narratives in a context where an “either-or” choice
will have to be made. We should consider the criteria that are likely to control what may
be called an “initial” theory choice between the two “factual theories of the case”
embedded in the opening statements. (This will prove important, though not always
decisive, because of the inevitably circular or interpretive nature of trial decisions
making: the meaning and truth of the whole (the theory of the case) is determined by
parts (the circumstantial evidence), but the meaning and truth of the parts (the
circumstantial evidence) is determined by the whole (the theory in which they are
embedded and give them both significance and relative plausibility).) Then we should
consider the meaning of the tensions between the form of narrative that prevails in
opening and that which occurs during the presentation of evidence. Ultimately one
would ask how the entire consciously structured hybrid of languages creates the situation
in which the jury is immersed and to which it responds. Though this is beyond the scope
of this essay, one should then show how that determination among the incommensurable
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values made by the jury was within its capacities, and identify the forms of understanding
that is consistent with the trial’s consciously structured hybrid of languages and
performances. Finally, one ought to provide an understanding of the place of this mode of
social ordering within the range of orderings available to us.

Epistemological Interlude: Why the Characteristics of Trial Narratives Matter
I don’t think that the trial has come to have the structure it does for exclusively
epistemological reasons. The trial is a practical enterprise, not a theoretical inquiry.
Political and moral considerations outweigh strictly epistemological considerations.
Nonetheless, accuracy has political and moral significance. (And epistemological
concerns have been in the recent past of particular interest to British and American
philosophers.) From a political point of view, the values implicit in the rule of law,
including democratic governance and the control of political officials, could not be
realized if officials simply could not find facts with some degree of reliability or could
easily manipulate evidence to justify their own preferences. From a moral point of view,
we should remember the words of Iris Murdoch, “What looks like mere accuracy at one
end looks more like justice or courage or even love at the other.”25

An attempt to think of the trial in much the way that the received view
understands it will show why the reasoning that occurs there is inevitably circular or
interpretive, and so why the received view cannot be quite right. It also shows why,
insofar as an understanding of the evidence is possible at all, one pole of this circular
movement will inevitably be a narrative. This is true because “the characterization of
25
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actions allegedly prior to any narrative form being imposed upon them will always turn
out to be the presentation of …the disjointed parts of some possible narrative.”26 This
means, of course, that characteristics of narrative are necessary characteristics of trial
understanding.

One may distinguish provisionally (1) circumcumstantial evidence 27 from (2) a
“bare” or “purely perceptual” account of events 28 constructed from such evidence from
(3) a fully characterized, or interpreted narrative of events, such as the kind of story told
in opening statements. In the common law trial, the jury starts with the third and then
moves to the first and second in order to decide between the two narratives presented.
The notion of a “bare narrative” is derived from one sort of question the jury will
naturally ask in deciding which of the opening statements proves to be the more
adequate. That question is basically, “What would you have seen had you been there?”
But even in the best prepared cases even the bare narrative will be underdetermined by
the circumstantial evidence presented. Often common sense will not be able to reliably

26
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assign relative probabilities to the episodes contained in the proposed and conflicting bare
narratives. Often there will be no circumstantial evidence at all to adjudicate the
potentially significant details of the bare narrative. The existence of this or that bit of
circumstantial evidence is likely to be hotly contested, a contest often made fiercer by the
relative lack of evidence one way or the other. (Could a police officer accused of
manslaughter for the shooting death of a motorcyclist bearing down on him have stepped
out of the way? Where exactly was his car parked? What exactly did he say before
shooting? How far exactly was the cycle when he first saw it and when he fired?) These
bits of circumstantial evidence come to the jury “under a description.” The description or
characterization of the circumstantial evidence may be hotly contested. (Were the
defendant’s words an “accusation” or a “threat?”) Since, as we will see, the plausibility
of the overall narrative is determined in part by its overall likelihood or probability as a
factual matter, its consistency with the empirical generalizations are contained by
common sense, these underdetermined factual issues of disputed characterization may be
decided in part by their consistency or coherence with the more likely “bare narrative.”
The lines of implication between the part and the whole run both ways, and those lines
are lines both of meaning and of factual plausibility.

That is, however, only the first of the inevitably circular cognitive moveme nts
even at the most basic factual level. Even when the nature of the circumstantial evidence
is both complete and uncontested (almost never), that evidence is always linked to the
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episodes in the bare narrative by a common sense generalization29 that provides its
“logical relevance.”
The jury will necessarily ask implicitly, “How universal is the
commonsense generalization that links the circumstantial evidence to the
episode in the bare narrative for which it is offered as proof?” Since the
structure of the commonsense generalizations that provide those links is
always, “Generally and for the most part…” the next question is always
“Are all the particular additional facts in this case (F1…..Fn)such as to
make the generalization more or less powerful than it would be, all other
things being equal?” But the existence of these latter facts (F1…..Fn) and
their proper characterizations will themselves be in dispute just as is F1.
And the strength of the commonsense generalizations that link those facts
to what the proponent seeks to show is also caught in another web of
mutually determining probabilities. 30
This suggests a kind of coherence theory of truth for the trial and even suggests that the
general criteria for the acceptability of one narrative over the other (“the best story”) can
overwhelm the evidence in a particular case. Trial lawyers like to say, “Every fact has
two faces.” Almost every fact can be interpreted to support either theory. In a murder
case, does the fact that the defendant drank a number of pints before the shooting make it
more likely that he was the perpetrator, because of lowered inhibitions, or less likely,
because his drinking would have deprived him of the physical coordination that this
particular shot seems to have required. The senses in which I am a “realist” about what
the trial achieves are complex. Evidence is not infinitely plastic to reinterpretation and
some forms of evidence, such as admissions of party opponents, much prized by trial
lawyers, are likely to provide relatively more secure anchors in these generally holistic

29
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processes. To borrow from Henry James, trial evidence is a kind of pudding, but it is a
lumpy pudding.

More importantly, the stories that lawyers may tell in opening statement are
highly constrained narratives, as we will see at greater length below. But this is not my
main point here. The only point I want to make here is that the existence, proper
description, and meaning of even the most basic of circumstantial evidence at trial is
partly determined by its place in different levels of narrative. They will thus be partially
determined, “colored” if you wish, by whatever renders those narratives more acceptable
to the jury. In the end, I argue that the jury is not simply making a theoretical or
historical31 judgment about what more likely happened. Its final cognitive state is not a
mental screening of the events that it determined to have occurred. It is, again, a literally
indescribable grasp of facts, norms, and possibilities for action. The devices of the trial
take it beyond story telling. The story, or rather the tensions among stories, are merely
the scaffolding that allows for the integrative and practical grasp that occasions the
verdict.

The General Significance of the Narrative Structure of the Trial
Narrative provides the “systematic means of storing, bringing up to date,
rearranging, comparing, testing, and interpreting available information about social

31
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behavior.”32 Cognitive psychologists tell us that “what does not get structured narratively
suffers loss in memory.”33 Empirical investigators tell us that narrative is “how jurors
actually organize and analyze the vast amounts of information involved in making a legal
judgment.”34 It is through narrative that we remember (re- member), and the internal
characteristics of narrative, such as presence of extraneous details, can affect its
plausibility even before any evidence is offered. We seem to have a natural
“predisposition to organize experience into a narrative form into plot structures and the
rest.”35 And, mercifully, this spontaneous tendency seems not to be a mere consoling
artifice imposed on a featureless substrate, because narratives are “found … in the midst
of experience and action, not in some higher level linguistic construction or
reconstructions in the experiences and actions involved.”36 In short, stories “are told in
being lived, and lived in being told.”37 Narrative structure demands of the story-teller a
judgment of relative importance that eliminates the inessential. It is often through a wellcrafted story that one can show “things that cannot be put into words. They make
themselves manifest.”38 The internal morality of stories is highly contextual. Although
32
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any retelling of a human action will involve some evaluation of it, that evaluation will not
be through what Stuart Hampshire called “an abstract computational morality,” in the
imposition of a single-ruled standard on that action. Rather, the narrative form allows the
story-teller to invoke all the subtle ties for the understanding of human action that the
culture’s common sense can provide. Narrative seems internally related to questions of
justice, and an important story schema—legitimate status quo, disruption of the status
quo, and its often difficult restoration39 --places the jury within the context of what
Aristotle called commutative justice. The jury is thus reminded of its practical task, to
take part in the action that will restore justice to the community.

The Distinctiveness of Trial Narratives: Theory, Theme, and Witness Examination
Trial narratives have distinctive features. The received view’s understanding of opening
statement is that it is a preview of the evidence that will be presented. It is in fact much
more. In A Theory of the Trial, I presented an edited version of an actual opening
statement in a criminal case. I offered a running interpretation of what the lawyers were
doing and how the openings functioned in the case. Each opening statement provided,
indeed “performed” the mode of social ordering that it recommended, in that case, one of
bureaucratic processing, the other of a combination of moral judgment and psychiatric
explanation. “What is to be done” determined and was determined by “What happened?”
Facts were, to a limited extent, purposes. Much in the way that Kuhn argued that

even in his later philosophy and himself argues that “[w]e narrate stories in order to make manifest
whatever unsayable meaning resides in them.” D. Luban, Legal Modernism (Ann Arbor, University of
Michigan Press, 1994), 201.
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proponents of rival scientific theories often “talk past each other,”40 so did the advocates
here. (It is also true at trial that it is “difficult, or, more likely, impossible for an
individual to hold both theories in mind together and compare them point by point with
each other and with nature,” or, in the case of the trial, with the evidence that would be
presented.) Each way of telling the story had a bite: the prosecutor presented a sequence
of the stages of the legal process and placed the judge within this “processing” of the
defendant, while the defendant’s more “omniscient” narrator could order all of the details
of the story to suggest a single meaning for the event. Each lawyer was aware of the
rhetorical dimension of what he was doing, and each opening was a product of what trial
lawyers call a “factual theory of the case,” an inevitably simplifying narrative
interpretation of what had occurred: much would be omitted by each party because it did
not contribute to his theory. The “political truths,” assumptions that could not
realistically be challenged in this forum in front of this judge, were respected by the
parties. Both parties knew what the anthropologist Clifford Geertz wryly observed,
whatever the law is after, it is not the whole truth. The legal terrain the parties were
moving on contained what evidence scholars sometimes call “codified inferences,”
apparently factual inferences that had been mandated “as a matter of law.” Thus,
appellate courts had sanctioned the notion that prior child abuse was evidence that the
abusor acted in the specific instance before the court with the knowledge that great bodily
harm was likely to result from his actions (even though no such great bodily harm
resulted on the previous occasions). This was actually a moral judgment impersonating a
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factual inference. Both advocates used language that appeared nowhere in the criminal
code—words like “child” or “victim”or “madness”—but which had enormous power to
define the meaning of the event being tried. 41 The ability of counsel to tell a fully
characterized story in opening inevitably brings to play all of the normative resources
embedded in the common sense of the community, its life-world. Aspects of the
situation could be shown that could never in this context be said. The legal categories
were not ignored, indeed had to be respected, but there was much more at work in these
apparently simple stories.

At trial there is not, of course, one opening statement, but two. As Hampshire42
has shown, this two-story schema is a feature of ordinary moral experience in which we
oscillate between two different ways of describing our actions, one of which approves
what we are considering, while the other condemns it. Although there is often no neutral
way of describing the alternatives, some us seem to have the ability to engage in a

41
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“theory choice” that is fairer or wiser. As I noted above the two opening statements often
talk by each other, since each is ur ging and , in a sense, “performing” the adequacy of the
understanding that it urges, as well as the eligibility of the mode of social ordering
appropriate to the interpretation of events it provides. Unlike standard narrative
historiography, where there exists a single account of events that purports to be congruent
with the single course of events it recounts, the duality of opening statements is
democratic. It leaves it to the jury to provide what coherence there is to the wellrepresented perspectives presented at trial. The duality of trial openings begin the
process of relativizing the easy moralizing that narrative allows and alerts the jury to the
always present danger of a gap between events and the retelling of them. They invite the
jury to look through the stories. It begins the process by which a well-tried case can
achieve some limited transcendence of the norms that are embedded in the common sense
scripts of the jury’s life world.

What are the normative criteria for what we can call a preliminary choice between
the stories offered in opening statements? Because the trial is largely a battle for the
imagination of the jury, and because of the interpretive nature of reasoning at trial, the
initial attraction of opening statements is important. Trial lawyers are taught that the
opening statement should make the jury want to rule for you. (Although now largely
debunked, there was even an attempt to argue that juries decide most cases after opening
statements and before the presentation of evidence. 43 )
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First, the jury will be comparing the opening statements to assess their relative
factual plausibility. This has two aspects. The internal coherence and completeness of
the narrative presented can affect its plausibility. “The inadequate development of
setting, character, means, or motive, as any literature student knows, render a story’s
actions ambiguous…In a trial it is grounds for reasonable doubt.”44 Even here one of the
constraints on opening statement is apparent. The opening is a story, but it also has
another performative feature—it is a promise. It promises that there will actually be
evidence to support what are actually conclusions, factual and normative, in the story
offered. (One of the standard rhetorical commonplaces of closing argument is to suggest
that counsel has “broken his promise” by failing to present evidence to support the
assertions made.) Second, unlike the kinds of stories told in most imaginative literature,
the story told in opening is about a specific event that occurred in the past, a definite
event. Each thing is what it is and no other. This forces the story-teller in general to
made relatively more specific factual assertions than he or she might choose for purely
“internal” rhetorical purposes. But factual plausibility will also be initially assessed by
what we may call “external” factual plausibility, the extent to which the story offered is
consistent with the generalizations implicit in the jury’s common sense, what trial lawyer
Louis Nizer, called the “rule of probability.” Each advocate relies on the kind of
generalizations that in part constitute common sense, that say, “Generally and for the
most part….” (for example, generally and for the most part, close relatives have affection
for their kin). But the opposing party will be telling a story (and presenting evidence to
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suggest) that says implicitly “…but not when…” Ultimately, a “triable case”45 will
present a level of even purely factual complexity that all previous common sense factual
generalizations do not conclusively adjudicate. Each case requires a “new” level of
insight even on the factual level, well beyond Kant’s warning that there are no rules for
the correct application of rules.

So far I have recounted the ways in which opening statements may be more or
less persuasive based on their “factual” plausibility. But trial lawyers, in presenting a
case, choose not only a factual theory of the case, but also what they call a “theme.” A
theme is the moral claim that the case makes and, in a well-tried case, pervades the
choice, characterization, and sequencing of all the details in the opening statement and,
later, in the evidence. For, as Paul Ricoeur puts it, narrative is “based on an experience
of an ethics already realized” in a context in which “there is no action that does not give
rise to approbation or reprobation, to however small a degree, as a function of a hierarchy
of values for which goodness and wickedness are the poles.”46 For good or ill, “every
historical narrative has as its latent or manifest purpose the desire to moralize the events
of which it treats.”47 This morality is what Hegel called Sittlichkeit, the norms implicit in
the practices and institutions of the society. “And this suggests that narrativity, certainly
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in factual storytelling, and probably in fictional storytelling as well, is intimately related
to, if not a function of, the impulse to moralize reality, that is, to identify it with the social
system that is the source of any morality that we can imagine.”48 “In this sense,
narrative already belongs to the ethical field in virtue of its claim—inseparable from its
narration—to ethical justice.”49 In the Rhetoric, Aristotle identified forensic rhetoric as
concerned specifically with praise and blame, and argued that narrative was its distinctive
medium. 50

Thus each of the opening statements tells a story in which there is an implicit
moral evaluation of persons and actions. The opening that presents the “more powerful
norm” will offer the theme that is most likely to begin to win the battle for the jury’s
imagination, and to provide the central organizing principle for the interpretation of the
levels of disputable fact that will appear in the evidentiary phase of the trial. 51 But the
trial is not only about a judgment of personal morality. It is a public practice carried out
within public institutions. Not only will the jury be making a moral judgment and
defining its moral identity, 52 it will be making a political judgment and defining the
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community’s political identity. “Stories tell us how each one finds or loses his just place
in relation to others in the world. And the communication of the story is confirmed when
justice has been recognized.”53 By exercising the power that they have collectively, the
jurors decide what they will do, based on what evidence, at what level of uncertainty.
Especially in criminal cases, which always involve the executive or police power of the
state, the jury will decide whether the exercise of that power is consistent with their own
political self- understanding. The opening statements thus have another performative
function, a “signaling” as well has a “labeling” function. Each tries implicitly to offer to
the jury a political self- understanding about the exercise of public authority to which he
or she can give her public allegiance. As deTocqueville put it in his classic statement:
The jury, and more especially the civil jury, serves to communicate the
spirit of the judges to the minds of all the citizens; and this spirit with the
habits which attend it, is the soundest preparation for free institutions. It
imbues all classes with a respect for the thing judged and with the notion
of right. If these two elements be removed the love of independence
becomes a mere destructive passion. It teaches men to practice equity;
every man learns to judge his neighbor as he would himself be
judged….The jury teaches every man not to recoil before the
responsibility of his own actions and impresses him with that manly
confidence without which no political virtue can exist. It invests each
citizen with a kind of magistracy; it makes them all feel the duties which
they are bound to discharge towards society and the party which they take
in its government. By obliging men to turn their attention to other affairs
than their own, it rubs off that private selfishness which is the rust of
society. 54
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An effective opening suggests that to reject the proponent’s case is to diminish the public
identity of the juror and the way of life with which it is intertwined. And so the trial will
inevitably involve an act of public self- interpretation.

Of course, the trial does not end after opening statement. 55 The opening’s
strength, its ability to offer the full range of considerations and norms relevant to the
meaning of the case can also be, from the perspective of justice, its weakness. Some of
the internal features of narratives that render them persuasive may be indifferent to the
truth of what is said. “That is to say the sense and the reference of a story bear an
anomalous relationship to each other.”56 Now the adversary context of competing
narratives and the constraints on opening statements already take this into account. But
so do the tensions created by the very different sort of narratives offered by the witnesses
on their direct examinations. These chaste narratives require physical description
followed by a chronological account in the language of perception. Openings try to be
fair to all the values implicit in the community’s common sense. That is why trial
advocacy is sometimes called “trial diplomacy.” Mercifully, the witnesses at trial are
rarely diplomats. They provide a much more personal account of a specific event. Those
accounts are a challenge to the universality of all the norms implicit in commons sense.
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Their accounts are not written by the author of the entire story, as are fiction, drama, and
at least some historiography. The witnesses are, to a large extent, really on their own, and
their accounts can create a tension between the proposed meaning of the case offered in
opening and the truth of what occurred in this case. Although we often see what we want
to see, we are able to see what may shock or disappoint us. Accuracy is of high moral
value. The accounts provided by witnesses provide a critique of the inevitably
overgeneralized principles that inhabit the common sense and the law of the community.
Finally, the “brutally elemental data” that the direct examinations offer provides the ideal
crucible for the determination of the central questions of the relative important in the
specific context of this case of all the competing factual and normative dimensions of the
situation. If “justice is conflict”57 the harsh tension of opposites created by the trial
provides the ideal forum within which justice can be done.

To show that these linguistic tensions can actually be the occasion of a genuine
form of understanding would require us to provide an account of human understanding
that was, in a sense, the subjective side of the trial. I believe that such a account can be
given, that there exist philosophical resources that provide the main lines of an account of
such understanding. 58 I believe as well that sensitive observers of what actually occurs at
trial provide evidence of these sorts of nondeductive cognitive processes. Holmes opined
that “many honest and sensible judgments …express an intuition of experience which
outruns analysis and sums up many unnamed and tangled impressions—impressions
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which may be beneath consciousness without losing their worth.”59 Judge Jack
Weinstein, a very prominent American trial judge and evidence scholar, put it this way,
“The jury’s evaluation of the evidence relevant to a material proposition requires a gestalt
or synthesis of evidence which seldom needs to be analyzed precisely. Any item of
evidence must be interpreted in the context of all the evidence….” In sum:
The capacity which leads courts so consistently to get it right is, I suggest,
a specialization of a general cognitive ability that functions in somewhat
different ways in both factual and normative investigations, and somewhat
differently still in the combined normative-factual inquiry that is the trial.
It is holistic and interpretive. It can grasp “the cumulations of
probabilities…too fine to avail separately, too subtle and circuitous to be
convertible into syllogisms.” It is likely to “trust rather in the multitude
and variety of its arguments than to the conclusiveness of any one. Its
reasoning should not form a chain which is no stronger than its weakest
link, but a cable whose fibers may be ever so slender, provided they are
sufficiently numerous and intimately connected.” The devices of the trial
both supply innumerable such fibers and dramatize their possible
connections in ways directly relevant to courts’ tasks. 60
Conclusion
What is distinctive about the narratives at trial is the way in which they are constrained
and counterposed to increase the level of intellectual tension. The story-teller must
anticipate his opponent’s case. He must anticipate the evidence that will be presented,
both because the opening statement is a promise, but also because of ethical rules that
generally forbid assertion of fact for which there will be no evidence. All conspire to
prevent the advocate from telling the most persuasive story regardless of its truth. The
opening statement is made in the context of what the jury knows to be a determinate past
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event and in a legal context that usually requires an either-or judgment of liability. This
demands a lower level of “subjunctivity” or indeterminacy of the key narrative
elements—details are blurred in opening only if uncertainty about the evidence forces the
advocate into that rhetorically unattractive posture. Each lawyer must respect the political
truths and legally codified inferences that operate within the legal order. Each lawyer has
the motive to emphasize precisely those facts and norms that the other cannot easily
integrate into his factual theory and theme. The advocate must be concerned as well
about the moral force of the jury instructions and, in civil cases, the possibility of a
directed verdict or a new trial. These constraints pull the accounts toward each other,
since they must anticipate the opponent’s most powerful evidence and arguments; toward
the evidence, because of the performative aspect of opening statement; and towards the
written law. The factual theories of the case are themselves in tension with the narratives
offered by the witnesses during their direct examinations, narratives that are, in their
particularity, unlikely to be wholly subsumed by the factual theory and theme of even the
most accomplished advocate. Cross-examination can be used to tell a “counter-story” to
the one offered by the witness, to the factual elements of which the witness must agree,
which can by contrasting selection, characterization, and sequencing of facts, offer a
starkly different interpretation of events. And both cross and final arguments can be used
in purely negative attack on the credibility of a witness and the persuasiveness of the
interference that the opponent offers.

This is as it should be. The trial proceeds by the construction and deconstruction
of narrative. It is the crucible of democracy. A well-tried case can refine the
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community’s common sense to the point where it can achieve a truth beyond storytelling.
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